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Monday, May 18, 2020 | History

4 edition of Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain found in the catalog.

Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain

Lange, Andreas

Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain

theory and empirical evidence

by Lange, Andreas

  • 182 Want to read
  • 10 Currently reading

Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English

    Places:
  • British Columbia.
    • Subjects:
    • Auctions -- Econometric models.,
    • Timber -- British Columbia.

    • Edition Notes

      StatementAndreas Lange, John A. List, Michael K. Price.
      SeriesNBER working paper series ;, working paper 10639, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;, working paper no. 10639.
      ContributionsList, John A., 1968-, Price, Michael K., National Bureau of Economic Research.
      Classifications
      LC ClassificationsHB1
      The Physical Object
      FormatElectronic resource
      ID Numbers
      Open LibraryOL3475993M
      LC Control Number2005615439

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Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain by Lange, Andreas Download PDF EPUB FB2

Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain: Evidence from the Lab and Field Andreas Lange, John A. List, Michael K. Price. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in September NBER Program(s):Industrial Organization. Auction theory represents one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades.

Yet whether and to what extent the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions remains under researched. This study begins by developing theory to explore auctions with resale when private values are by: Conclusions.

Auctions are ubiquitous. Yet whether and to what extent the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior when private values are uncertain remains largely unknown. We begin by exploring a novel data set that provides insights into the importance of the resale by: 9.

Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain: Theory and Empirical Evidence Andreas Lange, John A. List, Michael K. Price.

NBER Working Paper No. Issued in July NBER Program(s):Industrial Organization, Public Economics, Environment and Energy Economics.

Yet whether and to what extent the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions remains under researched. Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain: Evidence from the lab and field Auction theory represents one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades.

Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain: Evidence from the lab and field. By Andreas Lange, John A. List and Michael K.

Price. Abstract. Auction theory represents one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades. Yet, whether, and to what extent, the introduction of secondary resale markets.

Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain: Evidence from the Lab and Field By Andreas Lange, John A. List and Michael K. Price Get PDF ( KB). Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain: Evidence from the lab and field Article in International Journal of Industrial Organization 29(1) September with 67 Reads.

If you book a telephone bid, a member of the saleroom staff will contact you a few lots before the item is due to come up. Make sure you are available to take the call. Once bidding begins on the lot they will relay what is happening in the room and pass your bids to the auctioneer.

It may not be possible to bid by telephone on low-value items. Yet whether and to what extent the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions remains under researched.

This study begins by developing theory to explore auctions with resale when private values are uncertain. Auctions with Resale When Private Values are Uncertain: Theory and Empirical Evidence By Andreas Lange, John A. List, Michael K. Price, Andreas Lange, John. BibTeX @MISC{Lange04notice,is, author = {Andreas Lange and John A.

List and Michael K. Price and Andreas Lange and John A. List and Michael K. Price and Jel No. L}, title = {notice, is given to the source.

Auctions with Resale When Private Values are Uncertain: Theory and Empirical Evidence}, year =. Get this from a library. Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain: theory and empirical evidence. [Andreas Lange; John A List; Michael K Price; National Bureau of Economic Research.].

Indeed, if one treats (2) V r (X i)≡v r (X i,X i) as bidder i's private value, a similar optimization problem leads to the equilibrium bid function b f,r (x)=E[V r (Y 1)|Y 1 ⩽x] i.e., the equilibrium bid function for a first-price sealed bid auction without resale in which bidders had i.i.d.

private values defined by: Get this from a library. Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain: theory and empirical evidence. [Andreas Lange; John A List; Michael K Price; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- "Auction theory is one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades.

Yet whether and to what extent the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding. OPTIMAL AUCTION WITH RESALE.

Although the restric- tion is harmless with private values and quasilinear preferences when types are discrete (Maskin and Tirole (, Prop.

ll)), we consider a continuum of types here. a good is first offered to the bidder whose value is least uncertain to the owner. The wider is the spread of one's value. nber working paper series auctions with resale when private values are uncertain: evidence from the lab and field By Andreas Lange, John A.

List and Michael K. PriceGlenn Harrison, Liesl Koch, Andreas Lange, John A. List and Michael K. Price. Auction theory has represented one of the richest areas of research in the past three decades.

This study extends this line of work by examining theoretically the effect of allowing resale opportunities when private values are uncertain and all bidders are not risk neutral.

Abstract. Auctions are often used to sell idiosyncratic goods that may be difficult for potential bidders to value ex ante. In a laboratory experiment with uncertainty over final values, 18% and 27% of bids in private-value first-price and English auctions, respectively, were above the expected value of by: 9.

Private Value Auctions • Each bidder knows his/her own valuation. ⇒ My valuation does not depend on your information • When is an auction likely not to have purely private values? – Resale possible – Some bidders are “experts” Common Value Auctions • All bidders have the same valuation but they don’t know what it is.CHAPTER 9.

AUCTIONS Unknown Values. Thus far we’ve been discussing how sellers and buyers might interact when everyone knows each other’s true values for the item.

Beginning in the next section, we’ll see how auctions come into play when the participants do not know each other’s Size: KB.In common value auctions the value of the item for sale is identical amongst bidders, but bidders have different information about the item's value.

This stands in contrast to a private value auction where each bidder's private valuation of the item is different and independent of peers' valuations. A classic example of a pure common values auction is when a jar full of quarters is auctioned off.